Freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) and the Rohingya
Since 25 August 2017, more than 723,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar for Bangladesh. This is one of the greatest humanitarian catastrophes of our time. Because the Rohingya are a Muslim minority, many have identified freedom of religion or belief as a political instrument that could help ease the crisis. This post raises questions about placing such an emphasis on the religious freedom aspect[1] of the Rohingya crisis.
The Rohingya have long been subjected to widespread discrimination, and hundreds of thousands have been driven from the country in previous crises. In the wake of a wave of violence in 2012, more than 140,000 Rohingya were placed in internment camps. In the run-up to the election in 2015, the minority was denied all forms of political rights and was subjected to a campaign in which hardline Buddhist monks portrayed the Muslim Rohingya as a threat to Myanmar.
The fundamental problem for the Rohingya is that they are not regarded as rightful citizens of Myanmar, but as illegal immigrants from the Indian sub-continent settled on Burmese territory, which in turn excludes them from citizenship. This connection between origin, territory, ethnicity and rights has rendered the Rohingya particularly vulnerable. The religious aspect has made the conflict even more contentious because anti-Muslim agitation has at times been given a free rein and has been used for political mobilisation during the reform process. In a volatile situation, the fear among many Buddhists that their religion is under threat has been attributed to the Rohingya. The army has leveraged this dynamic to position itself as the protector of Buddhism. Religious discrimination is thus just one aspect of the Rohingya crisis. A one-sided focus on religious freedom aimed at protecting the Muslim part of the population may reinforce the perception that Buddhism is under threat and thereby exacerbate the situation, particularly for the Rohingya.
A Rohingya Muslim kid fled from ongoing military operations in Myanmars Rakhine state to Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh on September 08, 2017. (Photo by Zakir Hossain Chowdhury/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.)
One of the world's most complex countries
Myanmar is one of the world's most complex countries, with many ethnic and religious minorities, a series of armed conflicts, numerous militias and a stagnating peace process. Some of the large number of minority groups have affiliations with recognised ethnically defined states, while others do not. Citizenship, and thereby all political rights and rights in a broader sense, are tied to ethnicity, which in turn is tied to opinions on who historically are rightful inhabitants of the territory. All these factors combined create a highly complex situation for ethnic minorities, and particularly so for the stateless Rohingya, who after 25 August 2017 were mostly driven to seek refuge in Bangladesh.
Various phases and degrees of armed conflict between the central authorities and minority groups[2] have occurred ever since Myanmar gained independence from British rule in 1948. Some of the largest ethnic groups were led to believe they would be granted autonomy in return for their support of Burma's[3] struggle for independence, as set out in the principles of the Panglong Conference of 1947. No such process was ever implemented, however, and so the conflict between different groups and the central authorities began. A military coup was staged in 1962, after which the military regime justified its authority by citing the fear of instability and the collapse of the state.
Minority conflicts and religious freedom
To understand the significance of religious discrimination and religious freedom, it is important to keep in mind that these prolonged conflicts have largely been fought along ethnic lines which only partly overlap with religious divisions. At local level, conflicts and alliances have often been complex and shifting, and have been linked to a desire for control of populations, territories and resources. At national level, the organisation of the state has been the bone of contention, centring around three main issues: civilian vs military control of the state, the degree of decentralisation/federalism, and minority rights/inclusive citizenship.[4]
It is well documented that discrimination against religious minority rights is widespread in Myanmar. For example, the right to build churches or mosques is restricted. However, this is not what has driven the conflicts. Moreover, it is difficult to separate the religious discrimination from the broader conflict.[5] Little mention is made of religious freedom in the current peace process, even though the constitution recognises the special status of Buddhism. Instead, the issues that lie at the core of the peace negotiations concern the organisation of the state, such as the degree and form of federalism, the impacts on political and economic autonomy, the military's future organisation, and its incorporation of ethnic groups. Under different regimes, the Burmese central authorities have failed to find a solution to their relations with their minorities, which largely live in the more peripheral states, while central Myanmar is dominated by the Buddhist Bamar.
Minority rights
Given the extreme brutality of the military over many years, accompanied by harsh suppression and severe human rights violations, it can be difficult to separate minorities' human rights from rights to territorial autonomy. But it is important to remember that the two are not necessarily the same. For example, if a federal system were to be introduced in Myanmar, with greater autonomy for the ethnically defined states, several groups would remain minorities or would become new 'minorities within minorities'. This is because the logic behind territorial autonomy and political rights are ethnically defined, and the actual ethnic composition on the ground is far more complex than what the state map would suggest. Some groups have no defined territorial ‘homeland’, and would be particularly vulnerable under such a political logic. From a human rights perspective, the need for neutral citizenship and for rights that are not based on ethnicity will remain.
Rohingya Muslims mark Eid in a refugee camp, August 12, 2019 in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. (Photo by Allison Joyce/Getty Images.)
The Bamar people are the dominant ethnic group in Myanmar. They are Buddhists, and live mostly in the central areas of the country. They account for around 68 per cent of the population[6], and are the culturally and politically dominant group. Aung San Suu Kyi is Bamar. Beyond that, there are seven large ethnic groups – or 'national races' – with ties to an ethnically defined state, meaning they have a territorial 'homeland' even through many live elsewhere. These groups are the Shan, Karen, Chin, Rakhine, Mon, Kachin and the Kayah. The Wa, a large ethnic group with no state of its own, is extremely important. The Wa army is now the largest non-state armed group, with 30,000 soldiers. The Wa have an autonomous enclave inside Shan state. There are also large groups of ethnic Chinese and Indians with no ties to any specific territorial area.
Below these eight large groups are a further 135 recognised national ethnic groups. Ethnic groups on this list are entitled to citizenship. The Rohingya are not on this list, and therefore have no citizenship and are effectively denied all political rights. The Rohingya make up a Muslim minority which largely has lived in Rakhine State and which claims to have long-standing ties there.
The Rohingya's special situation
The justification for omitting the Rohingya from the list of 135 recognised ethnic groups in Myanmar can be summarised as follows: the authorities, supported by large parts of the population, maintain that the Rohingya settled in what is now Rakhine State/Arakan in the west of the country after the area was colonised by the British. The 1982 Citizenship Law sets residency before 1823 as a criterion for citizenship, marking the year before the initial phase of the British colonisation. Groups which, according to the authorities, settled in the country after that date are not automatically entitled to citizenship. They may still be granted citizenship, however, especially if they were entitled to it under the 1948 law. The authorities have drawn out this process for the Rohingya, further eroding their rights and, finally, rendering them stateless. Many Rohingya have lacked documentation that in theory could have granted them citizenship, or the knowledge on how to navigate the complex citizenship legislation.
The border between British India (now Bangladesh) and Burma was porous during colonial rule, allowing large-scale labour migration from the Indian subcontinent. Some of the anti-Muslim sentiment we see in Myanmar today is a continuation of the anti-Indian sentiment from colonial days. However, it has been well established that many Rohingya have lived in what is now Rakhine State for centuries. In any case, the debate over their 'actual' geographical ties is not especially productive in terms of finding answers to the current crisis, given that Bangladesh considers the Rohingya to belong to Myanmar, in line with the group's own view. The debate on origin is important, however, for understanding why so many in Myanmar share the authorities' view that the group should instead be called 'Bangali'. The Rohingya are not considered to be legitimate citizens of Rakhine State or Myanmar. The underlying logic is that citizenship rights are based on ethnicity, which in turn is based on territorial origin. This logic is not only expressed politically; it is laid out in the legislation governing citizenship.
Why are the authorities in Myanmar unwilling to respect the Rohingya's right to identify themselves as a group?
Recognition of the term 'Rohingya' would imply recognition that they do not belong to Bangladesh but are in fact a legitimate ethnic group in Myanmar. This would mean having to recognise several existing and potential rights related not only to voting and religious freedom, but also to political representation and territorial rights. Again, this is the result of citizenship and a whole range of political rights being based on ethnicity.
One aspect which further exacerbates the Rohingya's situation is the conflict with the Rakhine Buddhists, who themselves make up a poor and marginalised minority in Myanmar but the majority in Rakhine. They fear that recognition of Rohingya's rights and potential political rights will stand in the way of the Rakhine Buddhists' wish for greater territorial autonomy.[7] This conflict is not essentially religious in nature, though it has appeared increasingly so since 2012.
It is the Rohingya's lack of citizenship that makes their situation stand out from that of other religious and ethnic minorities in Myanmar. This has made the Rohingya particularly vulnerable. Today they are the world's largest group of stateless people. Moreover, the obvious connection between ethnic affiliation, citizenship and various political rights makes it difficult to imagine the Rohingya as a group ever gaining citizenship in Myanmar, a key condition the Rohingya have now set for returning voluntarily.
Are there any similarities between the situation for the Rohingya and other conflicts in Myanmar? One common feature is the behaviour of the army, whose extreme brutality is well known from other conflicts. Burning down houses, raping women and girls and driving local populations away are notorious methods. Thousands of villages in the conflict areas have been destroyed. The army is predominantly Buddhist, with Bamar officers, and committing grave human rights violations as part of its strategy against the minorities is nothing new. Nevertheless, the number of Rohingya killed or driven from their homes after August 2017 indicates that the persecution has reached a whole new level. Another similarity is the ensuing impunity for the military. This is a serious structural problem which several ethnic representatives and international human rights groups have long been highlighting, but this discussion has also intensified after the army's actions in Rakhine, with the International Criminal Court now getting involved in the plight of the Rohingya, and the International Court of Justice ordering Myanmar to protect the Rohingya against genocide.
Reform process and religious conflict
Why has the Rohingya crisis escalated in parallel with the reform process? And what significance does the religious aspect of this conflict have?
Since November 2010 Myanmar has undergone a military-led reform process[8] aimed at achieving 'disciplined democracy'. Simultaneously with the political reforms, and especially since 2012, there has been a significant increase in the use of hate rhetoric against Muslims in general and the Rohingya in particular. Since 2012, waves of violence have occurred between Buddhists and Muslims which have particularly affected the Muslims, and behind which the security forces are said to be involved to varying degrees.[9] Violence against Muslims has occurred throughout most of the country, though Rakhine has been hardest hit. In 2012 this led to a mass exodus to Bangladesh and to the internment of Rohingya, 120,000 of whom are still being held in prison-like camps in Rakhine.
Myanmar underwent extensive and rapid change following the 2011 reform process. This created a context in which it was easy to fuel existential fears of the threat Islam posed to Buddhism. Buddhist organisations, as well as some extremist monks, mobilised anti-Muslim sentiment around this imagined enemy.[10] Some of the most extremist monks had been imprisoned during the military dictatorship for inciting violence against Muslims. Due to the liberalisation that came about under the reform process, an alliance was formed between the extremist monks and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the party with close ties to the military.[11] The monks' activism resulted in a campaign to pass laws for 'the protection of the race and religion', meaning the protection of Buddhism from Islam. The laws, which were passed in 2015, limit rights concerning religious conversion, interfaith marriage and having children. According to the rhetoric, the reason behind these policies was to protect Buddhist women from religious coercion by Muslim men. The image of the vulnerable Buddhist woman who needed protection from the aggressive Muslim man symbolises the wish to protect Buddhism from Islamic aggression, invasion and population growth. Religious freedom for Buddhists had to be protected. Thus, the campaign adopted the international rhetoric of religious freedom, but it also acquired a specifically local dynamic.[12]
At the same time, during the reform process, the pro-military party USDP needed a cause that could mobilise voters in the run-up to the 2015 election. The USDP needed political legitimacy, and the fight against the Muslim 'threat' could provide it. Consequently, an anti-Muslim alliance was formed between the extremist Buddhist forces and the USDP.[13]
The reforms also allowed greater freedom of expression. Print and online media were used to spread anti-Muslim sentiments, targeting the Rohingya in particular, who already were considered illegal in Myanmar and who came to symbolise the constructed threat from Islam.[14] They represented the densely populated Muslim Bangladesh in a porous border area, and thereby a concrete religious, territorial and security threat. The military in Myanmar has wanted to get rid of the Rohingya for a long time. This wish resulted in large-scale anti-Rohingya campaigns in 1978 and 1991, when hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled Myanmar for Bangladesh.
The military's attitude towards the Rohingya was therefore no new phenomenon, but the reform process has given the persecution a new dynamic. It has created an alliance between the military and extremist monks that has mobilised popular opinion and support for the campaign to 'protect the race and religion'. The reforms have made it possible to take advantage of traditional and new media channels to stir up anti-Muslim sentiment. For example, the extremist monks and the military have themselves used Facebook to this end. It has been documented that the military sent several people to Russia to receive training in how to use the platform to spread hate rhetoric.[15]
2016: The situation is deteriorating
In 2016 the conflict took a new and serious turn in Rakhine. Following an attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a small Rohingya militia, the army launched a campaign that led to a serious crisis in October 2016. In the months leading up to the ARSA attack on 25 August 2017, in which 12 Burmese police officers were killed, the army intensified its presence in Rakhine. The reprisal attacks on the Rohingya triggered by the ARSA's attacks were therefore brutal, widespread and highly coordinated.[16] The army's attack was systematic, and was coordinated over a large geographical area. It is therefore reasonable to assert that it must have been planned at a high level within the army. Moreover, the brutality was so severe and extensive that it far exceeded any justification of a wish 'merely' to drive the Rohingya over the border to Bangladesh. These findings form the basis for the conclusion of the UN's investigative commission that there were grounds to investigate the army for genocide.[17]
In recent years the policy towards the Rohingya has received support – or at least acceptance – of large parts of the population, particularly among Buddhists and Bamar. Anti-Muslim sentiments resonate with the Burmese population. By virtue of their lack of legal status and of being made out to belong to the Muslim and densely populated Bangladesh, the Rohingya embody the sense of threat that is widespread among Buddhists in Myanmar. Constructed enemy images of minority religions is a well-known phenomenon, and the global hatred towards Muslims has played a significant role in the anti-Rohingya campaign. At the same time, Myanmar's authorities have actively denied the reality on the ground and have presented the campaign as a necessary anti-terror measure. Aung San Suu Kyi's statements have contributed this denial of the crimes committed against the Rohingya. She did not use her unique position to argue in favour of protecting the Rohingya's human rights.
The catastrophe that has played out since August 2017 is a culmination of many years of persecution. The army has long wanted to drive the Rohingya out of the country. The conflict escalated after attacks by a small Rohingya militia, and the military seized its chance. The democratisation process has made it possible to mobilise public support against the Rohingya.
Religious discrimination is thus just one aspect of the Rohingya crisis. If the Rohingya crisis is to be resolved, the Rohingya must gain citizenship and the authorities in Myanmar must demonstrate that they consider the Rohingya to be rightful citizens on Myanmar's territory. The connection between origin, territory, ethnicity and rights renders the Rohingya particularly vulnerable among Myanmar's minorities. Moreover, the reform process has allowed the mobilisation of anti-Muslim sentiment, which has escalated the conflict. The change in regime has created uncertainty among many Buddhists, and has effectively led to the Rohingya being seen as an existential threat. The army has taken full advantage of this opportunity to position itself as the protector of Buddhism and to get rid of an ‘illegal’ group in a porous border area.
Freedom of religion or belief: dilemmas for an international agenda
A fundamental challenge in all rights-related efforts that follow identity markers is the risk of contributing to further essentialisation of a conflict, that is, where a conflict is redefined as a matter of who the opposing parties are rather than one of more tangible benefits and resources that can be negotiated. If religious freedom were introduced as a potential solution to a conflict, the implication would be that religious conflict is a cause, which often is not the case. Fundamentally, the long-term solution to this problem in Myanmar is neutral and inclusive citizenship, not more emphasis on identity markers that divide the population.
There has been a sharp contrast between the view of the Rohingya crisis as seen from within Myanmar and the view held by international actors. This created a sense that the country is being opposed and misunderstood. An overstated agenda for religious freedom may further reinforce this 'siege mentality' in Myanmar. It could easily give the impression that the Rohingya's cause and Muslims' religious freedom was a foreign agenda. Buddhists may feel threatened by outsiders telling them what 'good' religion is[18], particularly when linked to Muslims' rights. The impression that religious freedom is a Western, imperialist agenda is reinforced by the fact that much FoRB-activism is organised from the United States and Europe through Christian organisations. It is a major challenge to support progressive voices that criticise the Myanmar authorities' handling of the Rohingya issues without confirming the impression that international forces are opposed to Myanmar and Buddhism. When individual actors draw an international agenda such as religious freedom policy into national or local contexts, it will inevitably be interpreted and modified within those contexts. In Myanmar this means that the campaign for religious freedom may heighten divisions between Muslims and Buddhists by making Buddhists feel threatened by an agenda that seeks to protect Muslims. Moreover, the rhetoric of the international campaign for religious freedom has been adopted by local Buddhists to articulate their demands for protection against Islam.[19]
In the efforts to secure minority rights, the agenda ought to be broad and inclusive in at least three respects. First, a more neutral language with a broad emphasis on non-discrimination is probably a better strategy than an explicit agenda for religious freedom. For example, issues such as the right to mother-tongue education and influence on curricula could be raised. Sooner or later it will be vital that Mayanmar's Citizenship Law be discussed, but this is a highly sensitive issue, also among the rest of the country's minorities, who find some protection in the fact that they are included in the list of approved ethnic groups. Such a discussion must come from within, preferably from other minority representatives or activists who can demonstrate that the Burmese form of citizenship creates problems not only for the Rohingya but also for many others. Second, international actors ought also to place emphasis on minority protection in their work in areas that are not self-evidently or directly linked to human rights. Almost all political and economic development efforts in Myanmar must be understood in light of many decades of war and conflict, and areas such as the utilisation of resources or infrastructure could in practice have major impacts on vulnerable minorities. It is critical to have an understanding of the minorities' overall situation. Placing the spotlight on religious freedom or on other minority rights must not replace an understanding of the broad scope of the rights and needs of the minorities. Third, a close eye must be kept on problems that will arise for new minorities, minorities without territorial rights or for minorities within minorities should Myanmar gradually develop into a federal state. Such a state system would cement ethnicity as the governing political principle and would render many groups that fall outside the largest ethnic groups or ethnic elites extremely vulnerable.
Given the level of anti-Muslim hatred in general and the situation for the Rohingya in particular, it is difficult to see how an explicit agenda for religious freedom can contribute to a solution. The Rohingya have other distinct, fundamental needs that must be met, and for other Muslims it is vital that religion not be politicised even further. At the same time, it is vital to prevent anti-Muslim hatred. It may be better to link this to, for example, combating hate rhetoric rather than make it an issue of religious freedom. Respected Buddhist monks have a role to play here by showing how to protect Buddhism without attacking Muslims.[20]
The way forward
The Myanmar authorities – military or civilian – have not expressed any desire to protect the Rohingya’s rights by granting them citizenship. No actors have so far exerted sufficient pressure to change this policy. Involuntary repatriation of the refugees is highly risky. Many Rohingya villages in Rakhine have now been razed to the ground and transferred to Buddhists, and returned Rohingya would have to live in newly built internment camps indefinitely.[21]
However, there are several factors that could change this dynamic. The coup of February 2021 has uncertain effects. The Rohingya will surely be not safe under military rule. However, the protests against the coup have led some activists to express regrets for their earlier attitudes towards Rohingya, albeit to a limited extent so far. The protest movement is much wider than NLD, and may unite young Bamar activists and ethnic minorities in their hatred against the military.
Facebooks has realised the seriousness of letting its platform be used for propaganda promoting crimes against humanity and perhaps also genocide. Among other things, Facebook has closed several accounts linked to Myanmar's military. There are, however, major challenges in controlling Facebook in Myanmar, and it should be kept in mind that much of the anti-Muslim campaign has been conducted through more conventional channels.
One final factor that is decisive to the fate of the Rohingya is of course Bangladesh's policy. The Bangladeshi authorities' decision to open its borders to the Rohingya in 2017 was decisive for enabling hundreds of thousands of people to find relative safety. But the refugee camps are placing an enormous burden on Bangladesh, which does not want the Rohingya to remain in the country and has not granted them refugee status. It is vital that international actors ease the burden on Bangladesh so that the Rohingya are not forced to return to unbearable conditions in Myanmar.
[1] The official term is 'freedom of religion or belief', which includes non-religious beliefs. The term 'religious freedom' is used here for the sake of simplicity.
[2] Many leaders of ethnic groups do not want to use the term 'minorities' and prefer terms such as 'ethnic nationalities' or 'ethnic national groups' because they tend to be understood to be more equal and to reflect their political status as ethnic nations. See Ashley South and Marie Lall. Introduction. In Citizenship in Myanmar: Ways of Being in and from Burma. Eds: Ashley South and Marie Lall (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2018), 3. The terms 'minority'/'minorities' is used here nonetheless, in line with international usage regarding minority rights; see the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
[3] 'Burma' and 'Myanmar' can be used alternately, though the latter is becoming more widely used. In this article 'Burma' is used in historical descriptions of a time when this was the name actually used by the country and does not express acceptance of the contemporary regime or its actions.
[4] Adam Burke et al. The Contested Areas of Myanmar: Subnational Conflict, Aid, and Development. The Asia Foundation, 2017, pp. 17–22.
[5] Susan Hayward and Matthew J. Walton. Advancing Religious Freedom and Coexistence in Myanmar: Recommendations for the Next U.S. Administration. The Review of Faith & International Affairs 14, no. 2 (2016): 68.
[6] The largest groups after the Bamar are the Shan (9 per cent), the Karen (7 per cent) and the Rakhine (4 four cent). The World Factbook: Burma. CIA. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html
[7] Burke et al. The Contested Areas of Myanmar: Subnational Conflict, Aid, and Development. 13.
[8] The term 'democratisation' is avoided here because it has associations with processes in countries that have achieved relatively well consolidated liberal democracies.
[9] Report of the detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar (A/HRC/39/CRP.2). Human Rights Council, 2018). 175 et seq.
[10] Matt Schissler, Matthew J. Walton and Phyu Phyu Thi. Reconciling contradictions: Buddhist-Muslim violence, narrative making and memory in Myanmar. Journal of Contemporary Asia 47, no. 3 (2017); Matthew J. Walton and Susan Hayward. Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, Nationalism and Communal Violence in Myanmar. East-West Center, 2014.
[11] Nick Cheesman. Introduction: Interpreting communal violence in Myanmar. Journal of Contemporary Asia 47, no. 3 (2017): 337.
[12] Iselin Frydenlund. Religious liberty for whom? The Buddhist politics of religious freedom during Myanmar's transition to democracy. Nordic Journal of Human Rights 35, no. 1 (2017); The birth of Buddhist politics of religious freedom in Myanmar. Journal of Religious and Political Practice 4, no. 1 (2018). It is important to stress that no support for the Muslim demographic 'threat' is found in population data, which shows that the Muslim proportion of the population has risen only marginally between the population census in 1973 and that in 2014 (from 3.9 per cent to 4.3 per cent); see South and Lall. Introduction. 8.
[13] Gerry van Klinken and Su Mon Thazin Aung. The contentious politics of anti-Muslim scapegoating in Myanmar. Journal of Contemporary Asia 47, no. 3 (2017).
[14] It should also be mentioned that a Rohingya militia now exists, and has carried out attacks on Burmese security forces. However, this group poses a marginal threat compared with other conflicts in the country and given the army's superior power.
[15] Paul Mozur. A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s Military. New York Times. 15 October 2018.
[16] Report of the detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar (A/HRC/39/CRP.2). 179 et seq.
[17] Ibid., 353 et seq.
[18] An important critique of the international religious freedom agenda has been written by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd: Politics of religious freedom in the Asia-Pacific: An introduction. Journal of Religious and Political Practice 4, no. 1 (2018).
[19] Iselin Frydenlund. The birth of Buddhist politics of religious freedom in Myanmar. Ibid.
[20] Matthew J. Walton. Misunderstanding Myanmar’s Ma Ba Tha. Asia Times, 9 June 2017.
[21] Human Rights Watch. Burma: Scores of Rohingya Villages Bulldozed. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/23/burma-scores-rohingya-villages-bulldozed.